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CASE NOTES
Antitrust Law-SHERMAN ACT-STATE ACTIONIMMUNITYIMMUNITY
DENIEDTO STATEAPPROVED
UTILITYPRACTICECantor u. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
The Detroit Edison Company (Edison), a privately owned
electric utility regulated by the Michigan Public Service Commission (Commission), distributes electricity and light bulbs to
about five million people in southeastern Michigan. Edison is
required to file with the Commission its proposed tariff, composed of the rules, regulations, and rates for all electrical services
it supp1ies.l When affirmatively approved by the Commission,
the tariff becomes a Commission order; thereafter, any change or
abandonment of the order without prior Commission approval
would violate state law.2 Unlike the tariffs of other electric utilities regulated by the Commission, Edison's tariff includes a lamp
exchange program by which Edison provides incandescent light
.~
bulbs to its residential customers a t no additional ~ h a r g eHowl. The Commission is vested with "complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all
public utilities" and to "regulate all rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions
of service" and to "hear and pass upon all matters pertaining to or necessary or incident
to such regulation of public utilities, including electric light and power companies . . . ."
MICH.
COMP.LAWSANN. $ 460.6 (Supp. 1976-77). Petitioner Cantor contended, however,
that only Edison's "utility" activities are properly subject to Commission regulation. He
argued that utility activities listed at id. § 460.501 (1967) include owning and operating
"facilities for producing, generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing . . . electricity
. . . for the public for consumption," but do not cover light bulb distribution. Brief for
Petitioner a t 12, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
2. The Court noted, however, that "there is no statute, Commission rule, or policy
which would prevent [Edison] from abandoning the program merely by filing a new tariff
providing for a proper adjustment in its rates . . . ." 96 S. Ct. a t 3114. For example, in
1964 Edison eliminated the lamp exchange program from its tariff for commercial customer service, without a public hearing, through a concomitant rate reduction. Id. at 3113;
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t 33 n.9.
3. See 96 S. Ct. at 3113-14. The lamp exchange program provides:
Incandescent lamps will be furnished without extra charge:
(1) To residents connected for the first time to the Company's lines, in
such quantities as may be needed for all permanent fixtures.
(2) As replacements of approved burned out lamps in proportion to the
use of energy for lighting purposes under the applicable rate.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t 6. The lamp exchange program was initiated in 1886
by Edison's predecessor, the Detroit Illuminating Company, and has continued uninterrupted for 90 years, with the Commission or its predecessor implicitly approving it as part
of every tariff since 1916. 96 S. Ct. a t 3113. Brief for Respondent a t 4, Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
According to affidavits submitted in support of Edison's motion for summary judgment in federal district court, the original purpose of the program was to encourage the
use of incandescent light bulbs to increase the use of electricity in homes, offices, and
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ever, the cost of the service is incorporated in the residential
electric service rate and is paid by customers whether or not they
utilize the exchange program."
In 1972, Lawrence Cantor, a retail drug store proprietor selling light bulbs in Detroit, commenced an action in federal district
court, charging that Edison's lamp exchange program constituted
both a monopolization of the retail light bulb market in violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act5 and an illegal "tie-in" requirement in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act.6 Cantor sought
to enjoin Edison from effectively requiring the purchase of incandescent light bulbs in connection with its sale of electricity and
to recover treble damages. Granting Edison's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the Commission's
affirmative approval of Edison's tariff and its continuing supervision of Edison's activities constituted "state action" that is immune from the federal antitrust laws.' The Court of Appeals affirmed? The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "neither
Michigan's approval of the tariff. . . nor the fact that the lamp
exchange program may not be terminated until a new tariff is
businesses serviced by the Detroit Illuminating Company. 96 S. Ct. a t 3114; Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 1, a t 4-5. Further, the lamp exchange service appears to have its
origin in the Company's desire to compete against gas illuminating companies. Id.
4. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t 4.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). This section provides sanctions against "[elvery person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among
the several states . . . ."
6. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).This section defines and prohibits "tie-in" requirements by
providing that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . [to] make a
sale . . . of goods . . . or fix a price charged therefor . . . on the condition . . .
that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . of a
competitor . . . where the effect of such . . . condition . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
7. 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (memorandum opinion). Stipulation
was made in the district court that, for purposes of the summary judgment proceeding,
the case be limited solely to the question of whether the state action exemption doctrine
of Parker v. Brown, 317 U S . 341 (1943), applied to the Commission's approval of Edison's
lamp exchange program. 96 S. Ct. a t 3113. The district court reasoned as follows:
[TJhe question that must be decided in order to determine whether summary
judgment lies is whether the . . . light bulb program can be characterized as
state activity or private activity. If this light bulb program is in law state
activity, summary judgment in favor of the defendant would be appropriate
since in such instances the utility would be shielded from claimed antitrust
violations.
392 F. Supp. a t 1111. The Court accepted the rule that "when a state agency acts affirmatively in approving rates and practices of a utility, there is no antitrust liability." Id.
8. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975) (summarily affirming district court opinion).

.
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filed, is a sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the
federal antitrust laws . . . .
999

A.

The Sherman Act and State and Federal Exemptions

Pursuant to its commerce clause powers,I0 Congress enacted
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890,11which codified as federal
law the economic policy that free competition should determine
the production and distribution of goods and services in interstate
commerce. The Act was also an "enactment of political economy," its proponents seeking to "curb private concentrations of
economic-and therefore political-power ."l2 Congress may create by statute express exemptions from the antitrust laws for
federal regulatory schemes.13If federal regulatory legislation contains no express exemption and is inconsistent with federal antitrust policies, the courts must ascertain whether Congress intended to implicitly exempt the regulatory scheme from the antitrust laws.I4 Generally, the Supreme Court does not favor exemp--

-

- -- -

-

--

-

9. 96 S. Ct. a t 3121. The case was remanded to the district court for consideration of
the question whether the complaint alleged a violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 3123.
10. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, c1. 3. See Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust
Review, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1972).
11. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified a t 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1970)).
12. First, Private Interest and Public Control: Government Action, The FirstAmendment, and the Sherman Act, 1975 UTAHL. REV.9, 44. During the congressional debates
concerning the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman commented:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and
among them none is more threatening than the inequality of condition, of
wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition.
21 CONG.k c . 2460 (1890). He also warned that "[ilf the concentrated powers of this
combination [industrial trusts] are intrusted to a single man, it is a kingly prerogative,
inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to strong resistance of
the State and national authorities." Id. a t 2457.
THE ANTITRUST
LAWS78-84 (1976);
13. See generally J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING
Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69
Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974). For a complete list of statutory exemptions from the antitrust
laws as of 1960, see Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 330-54 (1961).
It has been explained that "[tlhe Supreme Court . . . has no control over federal
statutory exemptions and is bound to enforce them regardless of whether they serve the
public interest or were designed only to aid narrow special interest groups." Slater, supra,
a t 80 (footnotes omited).
14. See Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New Test for State Action
Exemptions, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 287,291 (1973). In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), the first case in which the Court was called upon to interpret
the substance of the Sherman Act, the Act was read broadly to prohibit a rate-fixjng
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tions and is reluctant to find an implied "repeal" of the antitrust
laws.I5 Only in cases where the federal regulatory scheme is so
pervasive that it is clearly repugnant to the antitrust laws will the
Court find an implied repeal, and then only to the extent necessary.l6
State authority to substitute regulatory schemes for certain
areas of competition has traditionally been upheld.17 Congress
may, however, exercise its commerce clause powers to limit or
even proscribe certain state regulatory action.18 Since only commerce within the ambit of the commerce clause is subject to the
Sherman Act's prohibitions,l"he scope of the commerce clause
determines the reach of federal antitrust laws.
In 1890, the commerce clause was given a fairly narrow interpretation and extended only to actual interstate buying, selling,
and transportation incident thereto.20As a result, even though the
agreement among 18 railroads, even though the agreement had been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. a t 314-15. The Court emphasized the congressional
intent to end restraints of trade no matter what their source. Id. a t 340-41; see First, supra
note 12, at 15-18.
15. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20
(1975); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361,368 (1967); Carnation Co. v.
Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213,217-18 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
357 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
16. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 683-86 (1975); Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-74, 391 (1973); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,357 (1963); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S.
334, 350-51 (1959); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945). In Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., the Court stated that "[rlegulated industries are not per se exempt
from the Sherman Act. . . . Only a clear repugnancy between the old law [Sherman Act]
and the new [regulatory scheme] results in the former giving way and then only pro tanto
to the extent of the repugnancy." Id.
17. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876), the Court upheld a state's authority
to supplant competition with regulation in an area of the economy "affected with a public
interest" and noted that
it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country
from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of
charge to be made for services rendered, accomodations furnished, and articles
sold.
See Handler, supra note 10, a t 6-7.
18. U.S. CONST.art. VI, !l2.
19 See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 96 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 & n.2
(1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974); United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945).
20. See Slater, supra note 13, a t 84-85. Given this narrow interpretation it is unlikely
that Congress really considered a t all whether a state's regulation of its public utilities
was to be within the scope of the Sherman Act. Id. a t 84. One scholar has noted, nevertheless, that
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Sherman Act was interpreted quite broadly to strike down interstate activity permitted by state law,21it was not a major tool for
controlling predominantly intrastate economic activity.22Within
a few decades, however, purely intrastate activities could be regulated under the commerce clause if they had the requisite impact
on interstate commerce.23A concomitant expansion of state economic regulation soon precipitated the question of what result
would obtain when the expanding ambit of the Sherman Act
brings it into conflict with inconsistent state regulatory law.

B. The Parker Doctrine
Although earlier cases had rejected Sherman Act challenges
[b]y 1889, the Supreme Court had been called upon to decide the validity of
state or local regulation of rates in or entry into the lighting, water, and railroad
industries. Thus, by 1890 the public utilities field was, in fact, "one of the few
important areas of economic life" where government action had moved beyond
the bounds of laissez faire.
First, supra note 12, a t I 3 (footnotes omitted). It has been argued that "a full reading of
the legislative history of the Sherman Act is not likely to help answer . . . [wlhether
actions taken pursuant to the power of a state were to be included or excluded from the
Sherman Act . . . ." Slater, supra note 13, a t 83. For other discussions concerning the
legislative intent of the Sherman Act as it relates to state regulatory schemes, see First,
supra note 12, a t 13 n.38; Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local Governmental
Action, 48 TUL.L. REV.272,277 n.39 (1974); Comment, Participant Governmental Action
Immunity From the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction?, 50 TEX.L. REV.474, 482-84 (1972).
21. In Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), the Court rejected
the argument that defendants' compliance with New Jersey's liberal incorporation laws
in forming a holding company would shield from antitrust attack the consolidation of
Hill's Great Northern Railway Company with Morgan's Northern Pacific Railway Company. Justice Harlan declared that under the supremacy clause "no state can endow any
of its corporations . . . with authority to restrain interstate or international commerce,
or to disobey the national will as manifested in legal enactments of Congress." Id. a t 350.
22. In the early 1900's, however, the Court did employ an equal protection or substantive due process analysis to supervise and often invalidate certain state anticompetitive
regulatory programs. Later, as numerous state and federal regulatory schemes were considered fair and necessary to extricate the country from the Great Depression, the Court
largely abandoned economic interventionism in favor of judicial restraint or a "hands-off'
policy. See Note, Federal Antitrust Policy v. State Anticompetitive Regulation: A Means
Scrutiny Limit for Parker v. Brown, 1975 UTAHL. REV.179, 180-82. See generally Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L.
REV. 13 (1958); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP.CT. REV.34,36-40; Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15 STAN.L.REV.309 (1963).
23. Slater, supra note 13, a t 85. See, e-g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 605
(1939); Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago B. & O.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922). In
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Supreme Court ruled that as long
as the state regulated events within its own borders, other than transportation heading
for an out-of-state destination, the federal government probably lacked authority to regulate these same events. However, E.C. Knight was explicitly disavowed in Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948), decided only
a few years after Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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to restraints on competition involving state sovereign^,^^ Parker
v. BrownZI is the case most frequently cited for the proposition
that the Sherman Act was intended to regulate private practices
and not to prohibit a state from imposing a restraint on trade as
an act of government." In Parker the Court considered whether
the California Agricultural Prorate Act (Prorate Act) was rendered invalid by the Sherman Act. Enacted as an antidepression
measure, the Prorate Act was aimed at curing the chronic oversupply of agricultural commodities produced in California and
preventing the economic waste resulting from competitive marketing. The Prorate Act authorized a state commission to enforce
collective marketing programs designed to restrict competition
among agricultural producers and maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers.
Porter Brown, a producer and packer of raisins, brought suit
to enjoin Parker, the Director of Agriculture, from enforcing the
proration program operative in the raisin industry. A three-judge
federal district court held that the program constituted an undue
burden on interstate commerce and enjoined its enforcement. On
direct appeal, the Supreme Court requested both parties to brief
and argue the issue of "whether the state statute involved is
Assuming arguendo
rendered invalid by the . . . Sherman
that the proration program would have been illegal if established
by private parties, the Court held that the Sherman Act was
inapplicable to the state proration program since Congress did
not intend to restrain "state action" or "official action directed
by a state" when undertaken "in the execution of a governmental
Articulating its overriding desire to show deference to
24. In 1895, the first antitrust attack upon state actiion was repulsed in Lowenstein
v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.S.C. 1895), in which the circuit court held that a South Carolina
board having monopoly authority in the purchase and sale of liquor could not be sued
under the Sherman Act since the state was neither a corporation nor a person. Id. a t 911.
In Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), duly authorized harbor pilots, who were members
of a state created regulatory board governing the licensing of pilots, sued to enjoin defendant from acting as a pilot without state authorization. Against defendant's claim that
the state's restrictive regulatory scheme gave licensed pilots illegal monopoly powers, the
Supreme Court held that "no monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from
the fact that duly authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties
devolving upon them by law." Id. a t 345.
25. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
26. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).
27. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3115 & 11.16 (1976).
28. 317 U.S. at 350-52. Noting that Congress could, if it desired, constitutionally
prohibit a state from mandating a stabilization program, the Court declared:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which

918

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

state sovereigns, the Court ruled that "[iln a dual system of
government . . . an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress."' The Court warned, however, that "a state does not
give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawf ~ l . " ~It" also noted that it was not deciding the applicability of
the Sherman Act where "the state or its municipality [becomes]
a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade. "31
From Parker emerged the concept that the Sherman Act does
not prohibit "state action,"32 although the Court did not espouse
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature.

....

. . .[I]t is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the
program and which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy. . . .
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract
or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish
a monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 351.
30. Id.
31. Id. a t 351-52.
32. The term "state action" is used interchangeably with "Parker immunity,"
"Parker exemption," "immunity," and "exemption" (unless qualified as "implied federal
exemption"). Some writers believe that the concepts of immunity and exemption should
be differentiated to facilitate analysis, rather than used interchangeably as is done by
some courts and commentators. See, e.g., Saveri, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws
to Public Bodies, 4. U.S.F.L. REV.217, 217-18 (1970); Slater, supra note 13, a t 71 n.4;
Tepley, supra note 20, a t 280 n.54; Comment, supra note 20, at 476. "'Immunity' implies
that a subject has never been encompassed by a rule of conduct; 'exemption' implies that
a topic under regulation has been subsequently withdrawn from that regulation. . . ." Id.
"State action" is also referred to as "government action," Slater, supra note 13, a t 71,
and must be distinguished from Fourteenth Amendment "state action." One commentator speaking of Parker "state action" has explained that "[tlhe term bears little relation
to that used in the familiar fourteenth amendment context, and while its roots are ultimately traced to the eleventh amendment, most of the difficult questions will not be
resolved by eleventh amendment analysis." Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and AntiL. REV. 328,330-31 (1975). For a discustrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM.
sion of Fourteenth Amendment "state action," see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); 16 B.C. INDUS.& COM.L. REV. 867 (1975).
Similarly, Parker "state action" should not be confused with the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, which exempts from the scope of the antitrust laws joint efforts by private parties
to influence political and policy decisions of public officials. See United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). For commentaries on these cases, see Costilo,
Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH.
L. REV.333
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any standard for determining whether a particular action involving a state sovereign is exempt.33During the next decade, the
Court applied Parker quite narrowly to deny state action immunity to conduct permitted under state regulatory and legislative
authority." Since the Court did not directly confront the state
action issue again until 1975,35the Parker doctrine has been de(1967); Note, The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine, 57 CALIF.L. REV.418 (1969). In
distinguishing Parker "state action" from Noerr-Pennington immunity, one court has
ruled that "[wlhere political considerations are .absent the Noerr doctrine is inapplicable" since the Noerr-Pennington rule seeks to protect only First Amendment rights to
petition government officials to influence policy decisions. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972). Another court comparing the two doctrines has ruled that
[tlhe two are not coterminous. For example, an unsuccessful attempt to influence government action may fall within the Noerr-Pennington immunity, but
not the Parker immunity. Conversely, a state regulatory agency may decide to
restrain competition without prompting; the beneficiaries, not having solicited
government action, would enjoy a Parker immunity but not one based on NoerrPennington.
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29 n.4 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
33. Slater, supra note 13, a t 73. Slater reasoned: "It is safe to assume that the
language of the general exemption in Parker means that some state action is exempt;
nevertheless, the language of limitation indicates that not all state action is exempt." Id.
34. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U S . 533 (1944), the
Court held that the insurance industry was subject to the Sherman Act, despite extensive
state regulation. Congress responded quickly, however, by enacting the McCarranFerguson Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 15-20, 59 Stat. 34 (codified a t 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)
(1970)), which exempted from federal statutes "any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance," with provision that the Sherman Act and
other federal statutes would apply to "the extent such business is not regulated by State
law." Later, in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), the
Court invalidated a state fair trade statute permitting enforcement of vertical price-fixing
agreements among private contracting parties against nonsigners. Although Congress had
earlier passed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (codified
a t 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)), which specifically exempted from the Sherman Act certain price
maintenance agreements, the Court found the state statute enforcing pricing agreements
against nonsigners to be beyond the statutory exemption and not within the Parker exemption. In response to Schwegmann, Congress passed the McGuire Bill of 1952, ch. 745,
§§ 1, 2, 66 Stat. 632 (codified a t 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2)-(5) (1970)). This bill extended the
Miller-Tydings exemption to state statutes that enforced price agreements even against
nonsigners.
35. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In 1967, William Bachelder, a noted antitrust lawyer, reported to the A.B.A. Committee on Anti-Trust Exemptions that there was a "dearth of contemporaneous comment" on the holding and rationale
of the Parker decision. Bachelder, State-Approved Transactions, 33 A.B.A. A N ~ R U S TL.J.
99, 101 (1967). He also foresaw the future of the doctrine:
[A]s the concept of interstate commerce and of the reach of the Sherman Act
continue to expand, it is significant to note that there is probably a great body
of public utility and other economic activity directed, encouraged or approved
by various governmental agencies which operates under the assumed or assured
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veloped primarily in lower federal courts as increasing numbers
of antitrust defendants have claimed immunity on the basis of
some degree of state involvement .36
1.

Categorical approach

Through a literal reading of Parker, lower courts and many
commentators have generally embraced a categorical approach to
state action cases.37Without identifying or balancing competing
federal-state interests, courts employing this approach assume
that a certain category of conduct defined as "state action" is per
se exempt from the antitrust laws or is beyond the jurisdictional
protection of antitrust exemption such as that recognized and applied in Parker
v. Brown.
Id. a t 103. For further commentary see Verkuil, supra note 32, at 331, explaining that
"[tlhe Parker variety of protected state action suffers from a conceptually amorphous
content because it has atrophied over the years due to inattention by the Supreme Court
and indecision by the lower federal courts."
36. See, e.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976);
Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell,
518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d
1258 (6th Cir. 1974); Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d
754 (4th Cir. 1973);Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.
1972); Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Gas
Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062
(1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972);George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E.W. Wiggins
Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 363 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
947 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930
(1966); Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964);Asheville
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959); Chastain v. A.T. & T.,
401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975); Macom Prod. Corp. v. A.T.&T., 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D.
Cal. 1973); I.T.T. v. G.T.E., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972); Fleming v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F.
Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969). For additional cases, see Handler, The Current Attack on
L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (1976).
the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM.
37. One commentator has written:
Parker v. Brown may have been a correct decision. But the Parker doctrine has
been expanded in a way which has little relation to the reasons underlying
Parker. This seems to have occurred because the courts have looked for inspiration to a close reading of the language of Parker, a case which disposed of the
antitrust attack as a side issue, in three pages of the United States Reports, and
which is too narrow a foundation for the vast body of doctrine which has been
based on it. A reexamination of the reasons for a state regulatory exemption
should pave the way for at least some restoration of competition in many areas
which are not insulated from competition by state regulation.
Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y .U.L. REV.693, 739 (1974).
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reach of the Sherman
Various standards have been fashioned to determine whether
particular conduct is within the court-defined category of Parker
immunity. Some courts require as a necessary, although not always sufficient, element of immunity that the entity charged with
antitrust violation be either created or endowed by the state with
governmental p ~ w e r . ~ W t h ecourts
r
have based immunity on a
finding of some defined threshold level of state authorization or
or
approval,40state control or s u p e r ~ i s i o n state
, ~ ~ cornpul~ion,~~
38. Under this view "questions of validity of state regulatory schemes in light of the
antitrust laws are generally regarded as foreclosed." Posner, supra note 37, a t 695. This
approach concludes that "the Sherman Act must be construed to outlaw all anticompetitive state regulation or none, and that Parker properly chose the latter." Id. a t 695 n.2.
This approach is further typified by comments such as: "[A]lthough the Court in Parker
did not fully articulate the quantum of state involvement necessary to constitute protected state action, the Parker doctrine should play a per se role in immunizing state
public utility regulation from antitrust scrutiny." Verkuil, supra note 32, a t 339. Another
scholar has summarized:
[Tlhe Parker doctrine applies when a state seeks to implement public policy
goals which it deems to be more beneficial to its citizens than competition. The
approach adopted in Parker, however, is not one of balancing the importance
of the state policy against the injury to competition. A fair reading of the case
indicates that the Court believes that the Sherman Act, and its policy in favor
of competition, do not apply to state action taken in pursuit of public policy
goals, no matter how weak the public goals or how serious the injury to competition.
Slater, supra note 13, a t 91.
39. See, e.g., E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52,
55-56 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d
870, 871-73 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross,
298 F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (W.D. Pa. 1969). Immunity has been granted even though
proposals have originated privately. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440
F.2d 1135,1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light
Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1971). In Georgia Power
the court reasoned: "Though the rates and practices originated with the regulated utility,
Georgia Power, the facts make it plain that they emerged from the Commission as products of the Commission. They are thus immune from the operation of the antitrust laws
under the Parker exemption." Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
40. See Business Aides, lnc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th
Cir. 1973) (anticompetitive refusal to provide exchange service to competitor upheld when
occasioned by adherence to approved tariff). But see Macom Prod. Corp. v. A.T.&T., 359
F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (although approved by state commission, tariff eliminating
service essential to users of competitor's equipment declared subject to Sherman Act).
41. See Fleming v. Travelers Indem. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971) (immunity for private insurance company found where rates filed by the company were effective
immediately after filing, when subject to supervision of independent state insurance commission). But see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969)
(despite prior approval by state insurance commission, regulation and supervision alone
did not create immunity).
42. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text infra.

.
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state retention of final decisionmaking power.43Still others have
conditioned immunity on a finding that the challenged activity
was undertaken pursuant to a declared legislative policy to supplant some area of free competition with r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~
In determining the applicability of Parker to anticompetitive
provisions of electric utility tariffs, courts have generally granted
immunity only when the utility's rates and practices were subject
to "meaningful regulation and supervision by the state" so that
they were, in effect, the "result of the considered judgment of the
state regulatory author it^."^^ One lower court, however, has categorically stated that regulation by a governmental body of rates
to be charged by a public utility is a "classic example of the
Parker u. Brown e ~ e m p t i o n . "In
~ ~what appears to be the furthest
extension of Parker,47immunity was granted to an electric utility
engaging in anticompetitive practices even though the state regulatory commission had neither made investigations of nor given
its affirmative approval to the utility's anticompetitive tariff.
Reasoning that the state commission possessed adequate regulatory power to control the utility if it chose to do so, the court
justified immunity by inferring that the commission's "silence
means consent, i.e., approval."48
2. Federal-state policy balancing approach
Criticizing the categorical approaches of lower courts, some
43. See Slater, supra note 13, at 91-95.
44. In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U S . 850 (1970), the court of appeals was convinced by its reading
of Parker that "valid government action confers antitrust immunity only when government determines that competition is not the summum bonum in a particular field and
deliberately attempts to provide an alternative form of public regulation." Id. at 30. The
court then introduced a three-segment analysis to determine when antitrust immunity
may derive from a state's declared policy towards competition in a particular field. Id.;
see Slater, supra note 13, at 96-97.
45. Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U S . 930 (1966).
46. Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1133-34(5th Cir. 1975) (unsuccessful
attack against allegedly below-cost pricing of telephone rates regulated by state municipality).
47. Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011,1018 (3d Cir. 1971)
(commenting on the decision reached in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971)).
48. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th
Cir. 1971). Under its approved tariff, the electric utility sought advantage over its gas
competitor by offering substantial rate reductions to new home builders who went "all
electric." A similar fact situation gave rise to Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440
F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 US. 1062 (1972).
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commentators have interpreted Parker, in light of its underlying
policies, through a preemption or other balancing approach."
Preemption is a judicially created doctrine based on the supremacy clause50 and is designed to resolve conflicts between dual
sovereigns by giving primacy to federal law.51Out of respect for
state sovereigns, however, courts may employ a judicial canon of
construction providing that neither the general statutory language of the Sherman Act nor the general language of the commerce clause overrides important state interest^.^^
In a preemption-type analysis, the court identifies the federal and state interests in a particular area.53If a conflict exists,
it determines whether Congress intended the federal policy to be
exclusive; if so, the inquiry is ended and the state policy is
voided.54If it is not intended to be exclusive, the court ascertains
the substance and scope of the policy intended by Congress and
determines whether the state program "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congres~."~~
The state policy will be voided to the extent
that it blocks the effectiveness of the federal p ~ l i c y . ~ V i e w e d
through preemption analysis, Parker has been interpreted as an
implicit balancing of federal and state interests?' Since the federal antitrust laws were never intended by Congress to be an
exclusive system of r e g u l a t i ~ nand
~ ~ the state regulatory action
in Parker aimed at preserving economic wealth and protecting
49. See, e.g., First, supra note 12; Posner, supra note 37; Slater, supra note 13;
Verkuil, supra note 32; Note, Federal Antitrust Policy v. State Anticompetitive Regulation: A Means Scrutiny Limit for Parker v. Brown,1975 UTAHL. REV.179; Note, Parker
v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALEL.J. 1164 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Preemption Analysis].
50. U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2.
51. Preemption Analysis, supra note 49, a t 1167.
52. See Yosner, supra note 37, a t 704.
53. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-68 (1941).
54. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
55. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
56. The federal antitrust laws promote three general economic policies: to maintain
allocative efficiency through free competition; to protect consumers by ensuring adequate
quality a t a fair price; and to preserve small competitors, both as a noneconomic social
goal and as a means of approximating the perfect market. See Bork, Bowman, Blake &
Jones, Goals of Antitrust-A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM.
L. REV.363, 365, 369, 381-83
(1965).
57. See Preemption Analysis, supra note 49.
58. The antitrust laws are an interstitial system rather than a system exclusive of all
other regulation. H.R. REP.NO. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1890); 21 CONG.REC.2456
(1890).

924

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

small competitors did not block the effectiveness of the federal
policy, it was not necessary in Parker to invalidate the Prorate
Act in order to maintain the superior federal antitrust p01icies.~~

C. The Goldfarb Refinement of Parker
In the 1975 case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,6othe Supreme Court reexamined the state action immunity doctrine for
the first time in over two decades. Goldfarb brought suit against
the state, county, and local bar associations, claiming that minimum fee schedules established and enforced by the bars constituted price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act." Addressing
the question of whether the Virginia State Bar, a "state agency
by law,"62was immune under Parker v. Brown as a state entity,
the Court stated that "[tlhe fact that the State Bar is a state
agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust
shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the
benefit of its members."63The county bar, not a state agency but
~~
immunity on the
a private, voluntary a s s ~ c i a t i o n ,claimed
ground that the "ethical codes and activities of the State Bar
'prompted' it to issue anticompetitive fee schedule^."^ Rejecting
this argument, the Court ruled that "[tlhe threshold inquiry in
determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the
The Court
activity is required by the State acting as ~overeign."~~
further declared that "[ilt is not enough that . . . anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State
. . . ."67 The Court denied Parker immunity to both bars, finding
that neither had been compelled by the state to engage in pricefixing activities?
59. Preemption Analysis, supra note 49, at 1174-75.
60. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
61. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1974).
62. 421 U.S. a t 789-90. For the statutory language vesting authority in the state bar,
see id. a t 790 n.20.
63. Id. at 791.
64. Id. at 790.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 790 (emphasis added).
67. Id. a t 791 (emphasis added). The Court stated that the County Bar's arguments
for immunity "at most, constitute the contention that their activities complemented the
objective of the ethical codes. In our view that is not state action for Sherman Act purposes." Id.
68. Id. at 790-91. The Goldfarb "~ompelled'~
or "required" threshold standard had
been hinted at in Parker, 96 S. Ct. 3117 n.24, and had been expressly invoked by the

CASE NOTES

The Supreme Court in the instant case confronted for the
first time the task of determining the extent to which a state
utility commission may immunize-without any independent
regulatory purpose-a privately owned utility's anticompetitive
conduct in a separate, unregulated, competitive market. A majority of the Court refused to find state action immunity for Edison's
anticompetitive lamp exchange program, which had been approved by the Commission and which had to be continued while
the approval remained effective?
In Part I of the four-part plurality opinion,'" a majority
agreed that there was no state legislative policy to supplant free
competition in the distribution of light bulbs. Since the Commission's approval of Edison's decision to maintain an exchange program did not "implement any statewide policy relating to light
bulbs," the Court inferred that "the State's policy [was] neutral
on the question whether a utility should, or should not, have such
a program. 0 7 1
In Part 11, the plurality concluded that the "only Sherman
Act issue decided [in Parker] was whether the sovereign State
itself . . . was . . . subject to its prohibition^."^^ Since the instant case did not call into question the legality of any act of
Michigan or any of its officials or agents, the plurality found that
the case was not controlled by Parker.73In a concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Burger argued that the plurality's narrow reading
-

Supreme Court in determining whether immunity existed when foreign government action
was involved. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U S . 690
(1962); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298,
1303 (D. Del. 1970). Subsequent to Goldfarb, the standard has been applied in suits
involving domestic state action to invalidate an anticompetitive provision of a utility's
state-approved tariff where the provision was not specifically required by the state regulatory agency. Chastain v. A.T.&T., 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975).
69. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3112 (1976).
70. Parts 11and IV of Justice Stevens' plurality opinion were joined only by Justices
Brennan, White, and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger joined in Parts I and III, and Justice
Blackmun joined in Part III. Thus, Parts I and 111 represent a majority position of the
Court.
71. 96 S. Ct. a t 3114. The dissenters disagreed with the majority conclusion that
Michigan's policy is "neutral" with respect to whether a utility should have a lamp
exchange program. Id. a t 3134 n.11. They argued that the broad powers vested in the
Commission to "hear and pass upon all matters pertaining to or necessary or incident to
such regulation," MICH.COMP.LAWSANN. Ej 460.6 (Supp. 1976-77),included the power to
authorize the lamp exchange program. See id. a t 3139 n.26. According to the dissent, a
decision by the Commission to approve the program is itself an articulation of state policy.
72. 96 S. Ct. a t 3117.
73. Id.
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of Parker was unnecessary to the result in the instant case and
noted t h a t Parker immunity should be "focused on the challenged activity, not upon the identity of the parties to the suit."74
A majority agreed in Part 111 that Parker should not be extended to cover the instant case.75The Court conducted a twopart
to determine if the particular private conduct allegedly required by state law should be exempt from the Sherman
Act. First, the Court asked whether it would be unfair to apply
the federal antitrust laws to a private party who has done nothing
more than obey the command of his state sovereigm7' Acknowledging such unfairness when the private party has done nothing
more than obey a state's command, the Court announced a
"fairness" standard for deciding cases involving a blend of private
and public decisionmaking. Where a private party exercises
"sufficient freedom of choice" or has an "option to have, or not
t o have" an anticompetitive program and voluntarily chooses the
anticompetitive practice, it is not unfair to hold it responsible for
the consequences of its decision.78 Next, the Court inquired
whether Congress intended to superimpose the antitrust laws as
an additional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory mechanism in
areas of the economy already regulated by a state.79The Court
rejected for three reasons Edison's argument that the antitrust
laws were inapplicable to the lamp exchange program. First,
there was "no logical inconsistency between requiring Edison to
meet regulatory criteria insofar as it [was] exercising its natural
monopoly powers and [requiring] it to comply with antitrust
standards to the extent that it [engaged] in business activity in
competitive areas of the economy."80Second, even if such inconsistency exists, the standards for ascertaining the existence and
scope of the state action exemption must be a t least as severe as
those applied in reconciling inconsistent federal regulatory legislation with federal antitrust laws.81Finally, even though Congress
did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to areas of the economy
74. Id. at 3123.
75. See id. at 3121.
76. The Court did not label its discussion a "two-part inquiry," but rather explored
"two . . . different reasons" that might support a finding that "private conduct required
by state law is exempt from the Sherman Act." Id. at 3117. The dissent, however, characterized the majority's approach as a "new two-part immunity test." Id. at 3133-35.
77. Id. at 3117.
78. Id. at 3117-19.
79. Id. at 3117.
80. Id. at 3119-20.
81. Id. at 3120; see notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
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primarily regulated by a state, enforcement of the antitrust laws
against Edison was not foreclosed in the essentially unregulated
area of light bulb d i s t r i b u t i ~ nChief
. ~ ~ Justice Burger agreed that
"[tlo find a 'state action' exemption on the basis of Michigan's
undifferentiated sanction of this ancillary practice could serve no
federal or state policy.""
Concurring in the majority's result, Justice Blackmun proposed that an equal protection-substantive due process "rule of
reason" test be applied to determine if the potential harms outweigh the benefits of state sanctioned anticompetitive conduct.g4
A strong dissent rejected the plurality's narrow interpretation of Parker. The three dissenting Justices argued that the
question whether state action effecting a restraint on trade is
preempted by the Sherman Act was answered in the negative by
the Parker decision." They also warned that an application of the
majority's new immunity test to practices deemed ancillary to the
state's regulatory goals creates a "statutory simulacrum of the
substantive due process doctrine"" and "will surely result in disruption of the operation of every state-regulated public utility
company in the N a t i ~ n . "The
~ ~ dissenters cautioned that courts
cannot go beyond the Goldfarb refinement of Parker "without
disregarding the purpose of the Sherman Act not to disrupt state
regulatory laws. "8g

The Court's decision in the instant case significantly restricts
the ambit of state action qualifying for Parker immunity and,
together with Goldfarb, severely limits the broad categorical interpretations recently given t o Parker by many lower federal
courts. Of paramount importance is the Court's explicit adoption
of an analysis suited to identifying and resolving the conflicting
82. See id. a t 3119.
83. Id. a t 3124.
84. See id. a t 3124-28. Justice Blackmun introduced his approach under the rubric
of "preemption," id. a t 3124, yet his discussion of an "equal protection-type rule of
reason" approach would take "as a general proposition that state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits" in a
consideration of the case on its merits. Id. a t 3126. The "fact of state sanction [would]
figure powerfully in the calculus of harm and benefit," which resembles an economic due
process analysis. Id.
85. Id a t 3132 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. Id. a t 3140.
87. Id. a t 3129.
88. Id. a t 3139.
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policies of dual sovereignties that should underlie application of
Parker immunity. This case note will evaluate first the plurality's
narrow interpretation of Parker and then the majority's two-part
analytical framework for determining the applicability of state
action immunity to anticompetitive practices of state-regulated
utilities involving a blend of public and private decisionmaking.
A.

The Plurality's Overly Narrow Interpretation of Parker

In Part I1 of its opinion, the plurality stated that the only
Sherman Act holding in Parker was that a sovereign state, previously held to be a "person" within the meaning of section 7 of
the Sherman Act," was not subject to the Act's prohibitions?
Although the precise Sherman Act issue raised by the Court in
Parker was phrased in traditional preemption terms,g1Parker
may be read in categorical terms in light of the pre-Parker cases
in which courts resolved conflicts between state regulatory law
and the Sherman Act by finding that the state official or agent
acting pursuant t o s t a t e policy was not a "person" or
"corporation" within the reach of the Sherman Acteg2Such a
categorical approach would exempt as state action the conduct
of a state entity, its officers, or its agents.
Consistent with this approach, the plurality's narrow interpretation is arguably supported by certain language in the Parker
opinion.93Since there was no claim in Parker, and hence no rul89. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Roberts
reasoned that "[ilf the word 'person' is to include a State as plaintiff, it must equally
include a State as a defendant or the language used [in the Act] is meaningless." Id. at
163. It may be argued that the decision in Parker was a categorical answer to Justice
Roberts' contention.
90. 96 S. Ct. a t 3117. The plurality relied heavily upon the briefs submitted to the
Court in Parker to support its narrow construction of the Parker decision. See id. at 311417 & nn.16-20. The dissent used the same briefs to refute the plurality, see id. at 3130-32
& nn.6-8, and correctly noted that, as a general rule, the positions taken in appellate briefs
should play no role in interpreting the court's written opinions. Id. a t 3130. The dissent
astutely reasoned that "[a] contrary rule would permit the 'plain meaning' of [court]
decisions to be qualified or even overridden by their 'legislative history'-i.e., the briefs
submitted by the contending parties." Id. The conflicting views presented in adversarial
briefs and oral arguments do not bear a relationship to the Court's final opinion that is
analogous to the use of legislative history, which emanates from the same source as the
legislation itself, to discern legislative intent. Id. For the above reasons, this case note will
not attempt to evaluate the relative merits of the plurality's and dissent's respective
interpretations of Parker based on briefs submitted to the Court in Parker.
91. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
92. See generally note 24 supra.
93. The Parker opinion made numerous references to the fact that "state action," not
private action, was involved in the proration program. See 317 U.S. at 350-52. The plural-
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ing, that any private individual or corporation had violated the
antitrust laws, the plurality is technically correct in ruling that
the instant case "is not controlled by the Parker decision."g4As
discussed below, however, Parker should not be read so narrowly.
This narrow construction of Parker is inconsistent with the overall language of the Parker opinion, the post-Parker decisions, and
a policy oriented preemption-type analysis of the decision.
A categorical analysis would have been sufficient to dispose
of Parker,g5but the Court did not limit its analysis to the issue of
whether a state is a "person" within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. It also raised, without deciding, the question of whether a
state or its municipality, by participating in a private agreement
or combination by others for restraint of trade, would maintain
its antitrust immunity.g6This issue would not arise under a
strictly categorical approach.g7Also, since the Parker opinion
mentioned both "state action" and "official action directed by
the state," it is probable that the latter refers to action by private
parties pursuant to the mandate of the state sovereign (such as
the prorate producers in Parker) as well as to action of a state
entity. Moreover, the plurality's narrow interpretation "would
trivialize [Parker] to the point of overruling it,"" as the dissent
correctly argued.
If Parker stands for the sole proposition that state entities are
beyond the reach of the antitrust laws, such categorical immunity
can be easily circumvented by bringing suit against a private
party who is implementing the state's anticompetitive command? It is obvious that the dual system of federal-state regulation that Parker serves to safeguard would cease to exist if the
doctrine failed to protect private parties acting under the command of a state decisionmaker.
ity believes that carefully chosen language in each reference distinguished "official action"
from individual action, even when commanded by the state. See 96 S. Ct. a t 3117 n.24.
94. 96 S. Ct. a t 3117.
95. The Court could have ruled that the state is not a "person" or "corporation"
suable under the antitrust laws, i.e., that a state official is beyond the jurisdictional reach
of the antitrust laws. Since Parker was an official of the state, such a jurisdictional ruling
would have dismissed the complaint brought by Brown.
96. 317 U.S. a t 351-52.
97. If a state were not within the Act on jurisdictional grounds as a state entity, the
fact of joining a private conspiracy should not affect that immunity. See Preemption
Analysis, supra note 49, at 1173.
98. 96 S. Ct. a t 3129 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
99. In this posture, Parker would effectively stand only for the trivial proposition that
Brown should have sued private raisin growers instead of the California Director of Agriculture. See id. a t 3129 n.4.
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The plurality's narrow categorical interpretation, which limits immunity to only state entities, would contradict and overrule
all lower court decisions granting immunity to private, statedirected defendants.lM More importantly, this narrow construction would overrule the Supreme Court's holding in Goldfarb,
which focused on the "challenged activity, not upon the identity
of parties to the suit."lOlThe analysis of Goldfarbby Chief Justice
Burger is clear and persuasive:
If Parker's holding were limited simply to the nonliability of
state officials, then the Court's inquiry in Goldfarb as to the
County Bar Association's claimed exemgtion could have ended
upon our recognition that the organization was "a voluntary
association and not a state agency. . . ." Yet, before determining that there was no exemption from the antitrust laws, the
Court proceeded to treat the association's contention that its
action having been "prompted" by the State Bar, was "state
action for Sherman Act purposes. "lo*

Hence, the emphasis in Goldfarb on activities, instead of parties,
stands in direct opposition to the plurality's narrow interpretation.
The confusion and inconsistency of judicial categorical decisions may be resolved if Parker is analyzed in preemption
terms.lo3When so approached, the deciding factor in Parker was
not that a state official was named as a defendant, but that the
Prorate Act, enacted by the state legislature to supplant competition in the agricultural industry, was not wholly inconsistent with
superior federal policies. Thus, Parker did not create blanket
immunity for all "state action" or "official action directed by the
state"; rather, recognizing that the federal system contemplates
states as sovereign within their spheres of authority, the Court
showed deference to a state anticompetitive program not incompatible with federal law. Clearly, comity need not be shown to all
state programs, but federal courts should be reluctant to void an
explicit state policy. This preemption approach to Parker is inconsistent with the plurality focus on "parties" but consistent
with the Goldfarb focus on "activity." Since state law may be
superseded by the Sherman Act regardless of whether state offi100. See cases involving a private rather than a governmental defendant listed in note
36 supra.
101. 96 S. Ct. at 3123 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
102. Id.
103. Preemption Analysis, supra note 49, at 1173-76.
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cials are subject to suit for violation of the Act,lo4it cannot be
supposed that the Court would have found the Prorate Act any
less valid had the question been raised in a suit against the private producers implementing the program, instead of against the
state officials administering and enforcing it.

B. Two-step Determination of State Action Immunity
If all state or private conduct involving interstate commerce
authorized by a state were governed by the federal antitrust laws,
there would be a drastic restructuring of our entire economic
system.lo5Congress clearly did not intend such a result,lo6and
Parker expressly held that the Sherman Act did not proscribe all
state action leading to results which, if privately arranged, would
offend the federal antitrust laws. In recognizing this major antitrust exemption, however, the Court failed to articulate an analytical framework for determining the extent to which state policy
could undermine the strong federal antitrust policy. In subsequent cases the Court merely indicated that some state action
was not immune;lo7and, while Goldfarb articulated a threshold
inquiry,lo8it did not establish an analytical approach for determining state action cases once the threshold is passed.
The two-part analytical framework used by the Court in the
instant case provides the flexibility necessary to decide each state
action case on its peculiar factslogand, at the same time, achieve
consistent results. First, a court must decide whether it would be
unfair to apply the federal antitrust laws to private anticompetitive conduct undertaken in response to the command of a state
sovereign by considering whether the private party has exercised
a "sufficient freedom of choice" in the matter. Second, the court
104. 96 S. Ct. at 3131 & n.7.
105. See Slater, supra note 13, a t 75. Despite the rather wide construction of the
Parker doctrine over the last decade, the Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, warned in 1970 that "much anticompetitive state law and anticompetitive activity claimed to be protected thereby in fact violate federal antitrust law
. . . the alleged state law being ineffective to confer immunity. Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
L.J. 950, 957
(1970). He also foresaw the decision in the instant case by declaring that "if a state law
were contrary to the Sherman Act . . . the state law would be invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution." Id. a t 958.
106. See Handler, supra note 10, a t 7.
107. See note 34 supra.
108. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
109. Since industries regulated by state law vary greatly in the rationale, administration, and intensity of their regulation, a categorical rulemaking approach would not be
an acceptable solution.
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must consider whether Congress intended to superimpose antitrust standards on conduct already being regulated by a state.
1.

The fairness standard

The unwillingness of lower courts to apply federal antitrust
laws to state influenced private conduct has been predicated
chiefly upon the perceived unfairness of imposing treble damages
against practices approved, required, or tightly supervised by
state legislative or regulatory authority.l1°The plurality's discussion of unfairness presupposes the possibility of awarding treble
damages in state action cases. The Court justifies such imposition
by assuming that unfairness would result only if (1)"the hazard
of violating the antitrust laws were enhanced by the fact of regulation" or (2) a "regulated [industry] had engaged in anticompetitive conduct in reliance on a justified understanding that such
conduct was immune from the antitrust laws."111
In the instant case the hazard of violating the antitrust laws
flowed from Edison's tariff, which was a product of Edison's business judgment and private decisionmaking, not of a mandatory
order by the Commission to comply with the tariff. The Commission neither initiated the lamp exchange program nor recom110. The problems surrounding imposition of treble damages in state action cases is
discussed in Posner, supra note 37, a t 729-31:
It is not unlikely that the prospect of damages and the absence of any mitigating
doctrine has had a n inhibiting effect on efforts to curtail the reach of Parker. . . .
A privilege should be developed against damage liability for good faith
actions of private firms in securing or operating under state regulation. "Good
faith" would relate to the existence and reasonableness of a belief that the state
regulation was not invalid . . . .
The policy justifications for developing such a privilege are twofold:
First the line between valid and invalid regulation, whether permissive or mandatory in form, is not always a clear one. . . . If a prospective defendant must
bear the entire risk of invalidity, he is likely to be reluctant to comply with, or
avail himself of, state regulation even when it is valid. . . .
Thus, a privilege for good-faith reliance on invalid state regulation is desirable, in order to encourage individuals to rely on valid state regulation. . . .
The second policy justification to support the privilege proposed . . . is
unfairness to defendants subject to conflicting statutory commands.
Id. Another scholar has cautioned that "antitrust treble damage action is an inappropriate
vehicle for regulating public utilities." Verkuil, supra note 32, a t 339. He argues that
"[tlreble damage actions tend to introduce irrationality" into the system of state public
utility regulation and "may contradict the assumption underlying the need for regulation
in the first place." Id.
If the antitrust laws were enforced only prospectively against state regulated industries through injunction, there would never be a serious question of unfairness.
111. 96 S. Ct. a t 3121.
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mended its continuance.l12Although the Commission's approval
of the tariff may have provided an arguable defense against
charges of antitrust violation, such approval could not logically
have increased Edison's risk of violating the antitrust laws.
The Court found no facts showing that the Commission or
any other state agency led Edison to believe that its conduct was
exempt from the antitrust laws.l13 Even assuming the Commission had issued such assurances or guarantees, Parker warned
that "a state cannot give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful."l14 The Court characterized state action
immunity as an affirmative defense to conduct that is otherwise
assumed to be unlawful.115Therefore, it is likely that a party
raising this defense has engaged in conduct that, without the
involvement of the state, would be unlawful.
Under the system of federalism, there is no justification for
treating state-involved private anticompetitive conduct differently from other private practices violative of the antitrust laws,
except where a "sufficiently significant"lls nexus exists between
the private conduct and the state policy.l17For cases involving a
blend of private and public decisionmaking, the Court in the
instant case articulated the threshold level of private decisionmaking that is requisite to a finding of immunity.
112. Concerned primarily with the reasonableness of utility rates in relation to electrical services supplied, the Commission considered the exchange program only with regard to the light bulb expenditures included in Edison's service rate cost analysis. The
district court found that the rate schedules were derived after Edison "furnished the Commission with data including information on the free [light] bulb exchange program." 392
F. Supp. at 1112. Yet, Cantor's uncontradicted argument on appeal was that "the only
data to which Judge Feikens could be referring is a two line entry of bulb costs supplied
in pencilled work sheets which Edison made available to [Commission] auditors in 1972
which Edison's rate making officer admitted were part of voluminous documents." Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t 10.
113. Edison probably relied upon 90 years of uninterrupted Commission approval. It
is likely that if Edison had considered any antitrust implications of its lamp exchange
service, it may have relied on the generally expanded interpretation of the Parker doctrine,
which treated rate making activities of public utilities as per se exempt from the antitrust
laws. See notes 37-38, 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
114. 317 U.S. a t 351.
115. 96 S. Ct. at 3121.
116. The Court used the conclusory "sufficiently significant" phrase in declaring that
"[tlhere is nothing unjust in a conclusion that respondent's participation in the decision
is sufficiently significant to require that its conduct implementing the decision, like comparable conduct by unregulated businesses, conform to applicable federal law." 96 S. Ct.
a t 3119.
117. It would serve neither the state interest in economic regulation nor the federal
interest in maintaining free competition and dispersed economic power to allow mere state
participation to exempt private conduct. See id. at 3123-24.

934

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

Although the threshold inquiry in the instant case is couched
in "fairness" language, this touchstone is merely an alternative
linguistic form of the Goldfarb "required" or "compelled" threshold inquiry? The "fairness" standard, phrased in terms of
"sufficient freedom of choice" or "option to have, or not to
have," restates the "required" or "compelled" standard by approaching the same threshold inquiry from the opposite direction.llgBoth approaches attempt to delineate that degree of state
participation necessary to sustain a claim of immunity, but here
the restatement is much stricter than that of Goldfarb.lZ0In
Goldfarb the Court considered only the voluntary, unilateral decision of the state and county bar associations to engage in pricefixing.lZ1The instant case, however, presented a complex blend
of private, voluntary decisionmaking and state-enforced, mandatory compliance with decisions reached.
Prompted by the facts of the instant case, the Court chose
to refine the Goldfarb standard. Judged by the Goldfarb standard
alone, Edison's lamp exchange program would likely be immune
from antitrust attack as an activity "required" or "compelled" by
state order. Now, despite an accompanying state requirement to
adhere to one's private decision, when one freely elects to engage
in anticompetitive activity the Court will not likely grant an exemption. This clarification shifts the focus of inquiry from the
decisionmaking action of the state to the decisionmakingfreedom
of the private party. In the absence of a definite state policy
against competition in some area of the economy, this redirected
emphasis will prevent further extension of the state action exemption to private anticompetitive conduct that "masquerades
behind self-created imprimaturs of state approval."1z2Since the
federal antitrust laws should defer only to the economic policy
decisions of state sovereignties-as opposed to private business
judgments-it is not unfair to provide that a party exercising the
"option to have, or not to have" an anticompetitive program
engages in such practices at his own peril.
118. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
119. Whereas Goldfarb focused on the degree of state involvement to determine
whether the state "compelled" or "required" the activity, the instant case focused on the
degree of private involvment to determine whether private decisionmaking was superseded by state mandate.
120. The plurality noted that the Goldfarb standard would arguably "allow every
state agency to grant . . . immunity by merely including a direction to engage in the
proposed conduct in an approval order." 96 S. Ct. at 3123.
121. In Goldfarb, the state neither approved the price-fixing nor required the bars to
comply with their own price schedules. 421 U.S. at 789-92.
122. Verkuil, supra note 32, at 357-58.
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In applying the new "fairness" standard, unfair results can
be avoided where a private party is forced to choose between two
conflicting laws.lZ3If a party has no choice, but is compelled by
the state to engage in anticompetitive conduct, any violation
flowing therefrom should be deemed state action and liability
should not attach to the private party.lZ4By limiting the scope of
exemption to cases in which private discretion or business judgment is superseded by state mandate, and by making private
parties responsible for their own anticompetitive choices, the
objectives of the antitrust laws to promote allocative efficiency
and protect against a concentration of private economic power
will not be smothered under the proliferation of state regulatory
schemes.
2. Balancing of federal and state interests

Although a finding of "sufficient freedom of choice" on the
part of Edison would have disposed of the case, the Court further
explored the state action defense to consider how conflicts between federal and state interests should be resolved in state action exemption cases. The Court's preemption-type analysis is
premised on the belief that Parker reflected not only a valid legal
conclusion but a proper determination of policy as well. The
"state action" policy issue is whether Congress intended to superimpose the antitrust laws as an additional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory mechanism in areas of the economy predominantly within the scope of state regulation. In Goldfarb, the Court
did not go beyond the "required" or "compelled" threshold inquiry. Lower courts have generally ignored the need to balance
state and federal interests by reasoning that activity that meets
the threshold test is per se immune.lZ5Thus, perhaps the greatest
contribution of the instant case will be its exposition and exploration of the policies underlying Parker that should be considered
in applying the state action immunity concept.
In Part I, the plurality laid the foundation for a preemptiontype analysislZ6by identifying the incandescent light bulb market
123. The majority realized that "there may be cases in which the State's participation in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible
for his conduct implementing it . . ." 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
124. See VANCISE,supm note 13, at 84-85.
125. See Verkuil, supra note 32, at 357-58; Handler, supra note 10, at 16; note 37
supra.
126. The Court advanced three reasons for rejecting the argument that the antitrust
laws were inapplicable in the area of light bulb distribution. See 96 S . Ct. at 3119; notes

.
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as the economic area affected by Edison's challenged activity.
This program was carefully distinguished from Edison's unchallenged activities in furtherance of its more traditional electric
utility services? Declaring that the state's policy was neutral on
the question of light bulb distribution, the Court found no reason
grounded on concepts of federalism or dual sovereignty not to
apply the antitrust laws to Edison the same as to any other party
engaging in anticompetitive conduct in an unregulated field. In
the absence of a state policy, there was no federal-state conflict;
thus, the preemption analysis was essentially concluded.
In terms of preemption or balancing of federal-state interests, the instant case was a relatively easy case to decide. More
difficult issues arise, however, when a state policy is articulated
and must be reconciled with competing federal p01icies.l~~
In the
instant case the Court announced that, in resolving actual
federal-state interest conflicts, the standards for ascertaining the
applicability of state action immunity must be a t least as severe
as those applied to determine implied federal exemption^.'^^ The
adoption by the Court of the federal exemption standardlMinvolving a balancing of competing policies generally rejects the
categorical approach prevailing prior to the instant case, which
regarded as foreclosed any inquiry into the validity or pervasiveness of state regulatory schemes.131Applied to the facts of the
79-82 and accompanying .text supra. The first and third reasons are both elements of a
preemption-type analysis.
127. 96 S. Ct. a t 3113-14.
128. Parker and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 US. 384 (1951),
presented situations involving a definite state poiicy inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws. The legislative policy in Parker was to supplant free competition in the marketing of raisins with collective marketing and other anticompetitive practices. In
Schwegmann, the state legislative enactment clearly allowed for enforcement of resale
price-fixing agreements against nonsigners, thus implying the state's policy of allowing
this anticompetitive practice.
129. 96 S. Ct. a t 3120.
130. The Court in the instant case has either adopted the federal implied exemption
standard for use in state action cases or merely used it by analogy to defeat Edison's claim
of per se immunity as a state-regulated public utility. Whether the Court has explicitly
adopted the same standards is not crucial, for the importance of the instant case is the
overt decision by the majority to give maximum weight to antitrust policies in state action
cases through a preemption or other balancing-of-interests analysis.
131. See note 37 supra. The dissent argues that the majority approach will resurrect
the once discarded doctrine of economic due process. See 96 S. Ct. a t 3139-41. Although
reaching perhaps the same results as economic due process analysis, the preemption-type
approach of the instant case does not require the courts to substitute their own policy
judgment for those of the state by scrutinizing either the ends or the means of a state
regulatory policy. Assuming that a clearly defined state policy had been articulated, the
application of the supremacy clause would merely give primacy to federal policy when it
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instant case, the federal exemption standard would not result in
a finding of state action exemption for Edison's lamp exchange
program.13*Following this decision, courts deciding state action
cases should favor the federal antitrust policies, both in deciding
the weight to be given to antitrust laws and in determining
whether the effect of the regulatory action is to suspend the operation of the antitrust laws.
In contrast with the wide expansion of the Parker doctrine
by many lower courts, the preemption-type analysis of the instant
case may restore competition to some areas of the economy previously insulated from competition by state regulation.lS3This
restoration is critical since the policy reasons for exempting public utilities or natural monopolies from the antitrust laws are
meaningless when maintenance of the monopoly ceases to be inevitable or power in the monopoly area radiates outward into
areas where competition is both possible and desirable.ls4Although a preemption-type approach using a federal exemption
standard may inhibit the discretion of state legislators or regulatory agents, it is a result that seems "compelled by the existence
of a fairly well-defined federal antitrust policy and the supremacy
clause.
- -

is confronted by inconsistent state policy. If Congress does not agree with the Court's
application of the antitrust laws to areas of the economy that are "ancillary" to the
traditionally exempt rate making practices of public utilities, it may create an express
exemption as it has done in the past. See note 34 supra. The fact that Congress granted
exemptions after courts refused to create such exemptions "does not indicate that the
Court's decisions were erroneous, but merely that the Court had successfully placed the
responsibility on Congress to decide whether to replace competition with a system of
public control. It is certainly arguable that Congress is the proper and better equipped
forum for such lawmaking." First, supra note 12, at 31.
132. There is no "plain repugnancy" between Michigan's regulatory scheme and the
federal antitrust laws. 96 S. Ct. a t 3120. Nor is the lamp supply program "imperative in
the continued effective functioning of Michigan's regulation of the utilities industry." Id.
a t 3120 n.36. The Court concluded that "[rlegardless of the outcome of this case, Michigan's interest in regulating its utilities' distribution of electricity will be almost entirely
unimpaired." Id. a t 3120.
133. Compare Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754
(4th Cir. 1973) (decided prior to Cantor), with Litton Syss., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1976) (relying upon Cantor).
134. P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS106 (2d ed. 1974).
135. Slater, supra note 13, at 105.

